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Macroeconomic 
Performance 
In  the  first  half  of  the  1980s,  Bolivia  experienced an  economic  crisis  of 
extraordinary proportions. As seen in table  1.1, Bolivia’s economic debacle in 
this  period  was  striking even  in  comparison with  the  poor  performance  of 
Bolivia’s neighbors. Like its neighbors, Bolivia suffered from major external 
shocks, including the rise in world interest rates in the early 1980s, the cutoff in 
lending from the international capital markets, and the decline in world prices of 
Bolivia’s commodity exports. But the extent of economic collapse in the face of 
these shocks suggests that internal factors as well have been critical to Bolivia’s 
economic performance. The Bolivian hyperinflation of  1984-85,  for example, 
was  one of  the most dramatic inflations in world history and one of  the only 
hyperinflations that did not result from the dislocations of war or revolution. 
In  some ways, Bolivia’s economic recovery since 1985 is as remarkable 
as the economic crisis during the first half of the decade. In the fall of 1985, 
the  new  government  of  President  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  succeeded  in 
eliminating  Bolivia’s  hyperinflation.  The  inflation  was  cut  from  25,000 
percent per year during the hyperinflation to a remarkable 10.7 percent per 
year  in  1987.’  As  shown  in  figure  1.1,  the  disinflation  was  almost 
instantaneous: by early 1986 virtual price stability had been restored. 
The stabilization is all the more amazing in view of the extremely large 
and  adverse shocks which hit  the Bolivian economy after  the start of  the 
stabilization program.  As  we  discuss below,  the prices of  all of  Bolivia’s 
major exports (even the illicit exports such as coca leaf) plummeted in late 
1985  and  after.  The  terms-of-trade  deterioration  further  squeezed  real 
incomes,  worsening the  decline of  over  25  percent  in  per  capita income 
levels that had occurred in the  first half  of  the  1980s. The terms-of-trade 
decline  further  embittered  the  political  conflicts in  Bolivia,  which  have 
always been  acute,  and  also  directly reduced government revenues,  thus 
threatening the macroeconomic stabilization program. 
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Table 1.1  Economic F'erformance  in the 198Os,  Selected Countries 
GDP Growth  Inflation  Terms of 
(annual rate),  (annual rate),  Debt-GDP  Trade,  1985 
Country  1980-85  1980-85  Ratio,a  1985  (1980= 100) 
Bolivia  -4.5  569.1  136.8  86 
Latin America 
Argentina  -1.4  342.8  56.4  88 
Brazil  1.3  147.7  43.8  87 
Mexico  .8  62.2  52.8  98 
Malaysia  5.5  3.1  62.0  85 
Indonesia  3.5  10.7  36.6  97 
Korea  7.9  6.0  43.0  105 
East Asia 
Source:  World Bank (1988). 
"Medium- and long-term debt, public and private. 
In  1987 Bolivia experienced its  first  positive GNP growth  after seven 
years  of  decline,  with  an  increase  in  GNP  of  2.3  percent.  Growth 
increased to about 3.0 percent in  1988. These positive growth rates during 
1987-88  averaged about the  same as population growth  (2.7 percent  per 
year),  so  that  per  capita  income  remained  stagnant  after  eight  years  of 
sharp decline.  The greatest disappointment of  the  stabilization experience 
after  1985  indeed  has  been  the  failure  of  Bolivia  to  resume  solid  and 
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0 First  month of  implementation of  program 
Fig. 1.1  Monthly inflation rates, 1984-88 
Source;  Institute of  National Statistics, Bolivia. 161  BolividChapter 1 
positive  per  capita  GNP  growth.  In  our  view,  the  continuing economic 
stagnation is not a result of  the  stabilization effort per se, but is rather a 
result  of  the  recent  external  shocks  together  with  internal  disarray  that 
preceded the stabilization program. 
This monograph focuses on Bolivia’s economic crisis and recovery in the 
1980s, with a special emphasis on the role of external debt in the economic 
dynamics. The bulk of our attention is on the period from 1952 to 1985, from 
the Bolivian Revolution to the end of the hyperinflation. We do consider more 
briefly the period of economic recovery, 1986-88,  but in view of the lack of 
perspective on recent events, we are not as comprehensive in our coverage of 
the years after 1985. 
We  view  the  hyperinflation  as  the  culmination  of  deep  trends  in  the 
Bolivian economy and society, rather than the result of  short-run forces in 
the  early  1980s.  One  pervasive  theme  of  our  work  is  that  the  recent 
economic crisis is a reflection of  political and  social conflicts in  Bolivian 
society that have undermined the development process for decades. We  thus 
lay great stress on the failures of  politics in accounting for the failures of 
economic performance. 
1.1  Some Basic Characteristics of the Bolivian Economy 
Bolivia is a landlocked country with the second lowest per capita income 
in  Latin  America  (U.S.$470  in  1985).  All  indicators  of  economic  and 
social development in Bolivia lie well below the Latin American averages. 
The economy has been heavily dependent on two exports, tin and natural 
gas, for the past thirty-five years. Not  surprisingly, the cycles of  expansion 
and  contraction of  the Bolivian economy have followed quite closely the 
movements in the world market prices of  tin and petroleum. Moreover, as 
we  shall see,  the  accumulation of  foreign debt up  until  1980 took  place 
in  a  procyclical  pattern,  in  that  Bolivia  became  able  to  attract  foreign 
loans precisely during the phase of  high international prices for its exports. 
At  the  same  time,  in  the  mid-l970s,  a  thriving  underground  economy 
developed  based  on  coca-related  exports,  a  development  that  has  deep 
implications for the functioning of  the economy and the country’s political 
institutions. 
Bolivia’s long-term growth problems begin with the inherent difficulties of 
growth  in  a  landlocked  mining  economy  centered  in  breathtaking,  yet 
forbidding, terrain more than 14,000 feet above sea level. Bolivia is a very 
large and sparsely populated country. Its area is greater than the combined 
areas of the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France, with a population 
of  only  six  million.  The  country  is  divided  geographically  between  the 
Andean highlands, where the mining industry is located, and the lowlands to 
the east, where petroleum products and commercial agriculture are situated. 
From the beginning of colonial development, Bolivia’s political and economic 162  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
center of gravity has been in the highlands. The secular decline of the mining 
sector has led in recent decades to a shift in economic and political activity to 
the east. This shift, which is the cause of  significant political conflict, was 
accelerated by the sharp crash of  tin prices in October 1985. 
Bolivia’s economy since the colonial period has been based on mining, first 
silver from the colonial period until the late nineteenth century, and then tin 
in the twentieth century. With the population centered in the highlands and 
neighboring valleys, transport costs are extremely high. Therefore, while it 
has been profitable for Bolivia to export minerals such as silver and tin that 
have a high value added per unit weight, and therefore a low share of transport 
costs per unit value, Bolivia has been unable to overcome the transport costs 
for almost any kind of manufactured product. The problem of  transport costs 
was greatly exacerbated by Bolivia’s loss of its littoral on the Pacific Coast in 
the traumatic War of the Sea against Chile and Peru in  1879. 
The requirement of  high value added per unit weight in Bolivian exports 
helps to explain Bolivia’s only real diversification of exports in recent years: 
coca leaf  derivatives (the precursors of  cocaine) and  petroleum products. 
Petroleum products, particularly natural gas exported to Argentina, can be 
carried out of  the  country by  pipeline,  while coca  leaf  can be  profitably 
transported even if  carried on a peasant’s back.  Table  1.2 shows Bolivia’s 
concentration  of  non-coca  exports  in  recent  years.  Among  Bolivia’s 
measured exports (i.e., excluding coca), tin and petroleum products usually 
accounted for much more than half of total exports during the 1960s, 1970s, 
and  1980s. Coca exports in the  1980s are generally estimated to equal the 
sum of tin and natural gas exports. 
Table 1.2  Share of Tin and Natural Gas in Total  Exports of Bolivia, 1952-84 
As  % of  As % of 
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Source:  Central Bank of  Bolivia, Boletin Estodistico (La Paz),  various issues 163  BolividChapter  1 
Many of  Bolivia’s problems can be seen as the tragic playing out of  the 
secular decline in the mining sector, a process that has been underway for at 
least half  a  ~entury.~  Actually,  Bolivia’s  first  deep  crisis  came  with  the 
depletion of  silver deposits and the fall of  world silver prices at the end of 
the last century. Good fortune, however, pulled Bolivia out of crisis when a 
boom  in  world  demand  for  tin  followed the  development of  the  modem 
canning process.  The  apogee  of  modem  Bolivian economic development 
relative to the neighboring countries was reached in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century, when tin was intensively developed and when export 
earnings  provided  the  basis  for  a  major  extension  of  the  country’s 
infrastructure, including roads and the railway system. 
Tin lodes were increasingly exhausted in the 1920s, and Bolivia began to 
lose export competitiveness with other producers. When tin prices collapsed 
at the start of the Great Depression, Bolivia became the first country in that 
crisis to default on its sovereign foreign debt, in January 1931. Bolivia was 
also the last country in Latin America to settle these defaulted debts after 
World  War  11.  The collapse of  tin  undermined both  the economy and the 
political system, and eventually ushered in the Revolution of  1952. 
1.1.1  Aggregate Growth 
Table  1.3 shows some indicators of  long-term gr~wth.~  Real GDP grew 
between 1952 and 1985 at the average annual rate of 2.4 percent. If the crisis 
years of  1982-85  are left out, the average annual rate is 3.2 percent (or 0.4 
percent in per capita terms). The growth, of course, was not smooth and was 
characterized by  well-defined cycles. The years  1952-57,  in the aftermath 
of  the  Revolution,  showed  negative rates  of  growth  as  important  social 
changes prompted  major dislocations of  production. In particular, agricul- 
tural output in cash crops suffered a substantial reduction after the first year 
of  an ambitious agrarian reform. The high inflation of those years, coupled 
with misguided policy measures that attempted to suppress the symptoms of 
inflation, also had important negative real effects. 
After the inflation stabilization of late 1957 until the early 1960s, growth 
resumed at a moderate pace. In 1959 the negative rate of growth is explained 
by  a sharp drop in tin prices brought about by  the mild world recession of 
1958-59  and the sales of  tin in international markets by  the Soviet Union. 
From  1962 to  1972, very healthy rates of  growth are observed, higher on 
average than the growth rates of the “export boom years”  between 1972 and 
1977. The growth in the 1960s is due importantly to a favorable international 
environment, internal political stability under President Barrientos, and the 
payoffs on earlier investments in petroleum and commercial agriculture in 
eastern  Bolivia.  Appropriate  use  of  foreign  aid  funds,  entrepreneurship 
provided by the educated Bolivians who had fled from the Revolution and had 
returned in the mid- 196Os, and the substantial investment expenditures made 
by the Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation were also important sources of growth. 164  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 1.3  Real GDP, Levels and Rates of Growth, 1952-88 
Five-year 
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Source:  Central  Bank of  Bolivia,  Cuentas Nacionales no.  4, Departamento  Cuentas Nacionales (La  Paz: 
1983). and for 1984-88,  IMF, Internarional Financial Statisrics. 
Notes:  1988, estimated. Five-year averages are calculated as geometric averages over the period. 
Growth remained relatively strong during the Banzer regime,  1971  -78, 
but  the  bases  of  the  observed prosperity became  more  tenuous.  Bolivian 
growth  was  based  importantly  on  heavy  foreign borrowing  from  private 
banks,  as well as  a temporary  commodity price  boom  which  favored the 
country. The pace of  growth started to sharply decline from 1978 on. The 
high  inflation  of  1982-85,  to  which  we  devote  substantial  attention  in 
chapter 5,  was accompanied by  negative rates of  growth. 
In  regard  to  the  composition  of  output,  shown  in  table  1.4,  primary 
production, including agriculture, accounted for 47 percent of GDP in 1952; 165  BolividChapter  1 
Table 1.4  Sectoral Composition of GDP (percentages) 
Sector  1952  1957  1962  1967  1972  1977  1982  198Y 
Primary  46.51  44.84  39.94  38.40  29.08  25.75  34.21  32.23 
Manufacturing  14.15  12.34  14.05  15.28  14.60  15.86  11.96  9.83 
Nontradables I  4.61  4.60  5.42  6.30  5.35  5.93  4.04  4.15 
Nontradables  I1  34.73  38.23  40.60  40.02  50.97  52.46  46.15  50.69 
Indirect taxes  2.64  3.10 
GDP  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
b  b  b  b  b  b 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Revisfa de Planificacion y Desarrollo (La  Paz: 1970);  Central Bank of Bolivia, 
Boletin Esradistico (La Paz), various issues. 
Norest  Percentages are computed from basic data in real terms. Nontradables I = energy and constmction. 
Nontradables I1  = commerce, transportation, and other services. 
”Estimated figures. 
bIndirect taxes are  included in each sector. 
the corresponding percentage was 32 in 1985. The share of manufacturing in 
GDP  in  1952 was  14  percent,  compared  with  a low  9  percent in  1985. 
Construction and energy accounted for almost 5 percent of GDP in 1952 and 
for  4  percent  in  1985.  Commerce,  transportation,  and  other  services 
(denoted “nontradables  11”  in the table) constituted 35  percent of  GDP in 
1952,  with  that  share rising to  51 percent  in  1985.  This  latter group of 
industries,  which  experienced  such  a  dramatic  increase  in  share,  are 
generally nontradables. Between 1967 and 1977, services increased its share 
in the  economy  from 40  percent  to  more  than  50 percent of  GDP.  This 
change in  the  composition of  GDP,  with  a  higher  share of  nontradables 
(services  plus  a  significant but  unknown  percentage  of  agricultural  and 
manufacturing output), became in the 1980s an important explanatory factor 
of the difficulties of  servicing the accumulated foreign debt. 
1.1.2  Foreign Trade 
Bolivia’s growth and development have been very strongly tied to foreign 
trade. With the exception of  a few years in the period  1952-82,  generally 
associated with strong political disruptions, exports amounted to more than 
20 percent of GDP in current prices (table 1.5). The dependency on imports 
is obviously very high with import-GDP ratios rarely below 20 percent (in 
some years, the ratio is over 25 percent). 
As  we  noted in  table  1.2, Bolivia’s legal exports during  1952-85  were 
highly concentrated in two major exports,  tin and natural gas, with natural 
gas exports  beginning in  1972.  In  some years,  more  than  70 percent  of 
measured exports are in these two commodities. Export diversification was 
one of  the principal economic policy  goals of  the revolutionary period  of 
1952-56.  However, after the stabilization program of  December 1956, the 
policy was largely abandoned and the export concentration on tin increased 
substantially. After 1966 the share of tin in total exports declined because of 
the growing importance of  petroleum and agricultural exports. The cycle of 166  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 1.5  Trade as a Percentage of Bolivia’s GDP, 1956-85’ 
Period  Exports  Imports  Total 
1956-60  17.7  24.6  42.3 
1961-65  18.5  25.0  43.4 
I966 -  70  20.7  24.0  44.7 
I971  -75  26.8  22.5  49.3 
1976-80  20.7  23.4  44.1 
1981-85  15.5  13.7  29.2 
Sources: For  1956-80,  Ceneal Bank of  Bolivia, Boletin Estadistico (La Paz), various issues; for  1981-85, 
unpublished data from the World Bank. 
“Annual averages. Percentages are derived from National Accounts data in current prices. 
decreasing  dependency on tin and natural gas ended around  1977. During 
the crisis years of  1982-85,  natural gas became the most important export. 
In  1985 natural gas and tin constituted almost 90 percent of  all exports. 
The performance of exports was rather dismal from 1952 to 1985, as can be 
observed in table 1.6, but again very definite cycles of expansion and contraction 
can be distinguished. Between 1952 and 1961, the average annual rate of export 
growth  was  negative.  In  the  quinquennium  1962-67  there  was  a  healthy 
recovery that then  slowed down between 1967 and  1971. The big boost in the 
dollar value of exports occurred between 1972 and 1977 because of higher prices, 
but in volume terms the growth of exports was negative during 1970-75 and very 
low during 1976-80.  It is notable that despite the uniformly good real prices for 
exports during most of the 1970s, the output response was weak. 
The year  1974 has been called by  some observers a “miraculous”  one for 
Bolivian exports. The index of export prices almost doubled from its level of the 
previous year.  In the export basket, the price  of  tin  increased 70 percent  in 
nominal terms and 40 percent in real terms. Tin prices would remain high with 
a slight downward trend until the collapse of the market in  1985 (figure 1.2). 
Imports  generally followed the  growth  path  of  exports,  though  in  the 
1980s, imports fell sharply as export earnings were devoted increasingly to 
debt servicing. Transportation and insurance costs loom large in the CIF value 
of imports, given the geography of Bolivia and its rudimentary transportation 
network. Transportation costs are also a very  important determinant of  the 
structure of Bolivian exports. As mentioned earlier, because of the high costs 
of transportation, exports have to be of  high value added per unit of  weight. 
1.1.3  Capital Formation and the Sources of Funds 
The share of  fixed investment in GDP varied widely during  1952-85,  as 
is shown in table 1.7. The long-run value of this rate seems to be, however, 
above 15 percent. In the two years following the Revolution of  1952, the 
investment rates fell below this long-run value, but there was a substantial 
recovery in 1955 and 1956 despite extremely high inflation. In fact, contrary 
to what occurred during the  1980s, forced savings (i.e.,  the inflation tax) 
helped to sustain a high investment rate. 167  BolividChapter 1 
Tnble 1.6  Annual Rates of Growth of Main Export (volumes), 1950-85 
Period  Tin  Natural Gas"  Total Exports 
-  .3  1950-55  -2.3  - 
1955-60  -7.0  -6.1 
3.0  1960-65  4.2  - 
9.4  1965  -70  2.8  - 
1970-75  -  2.2  -  -5.5 
1975-80  -  2.0  5.6  1.5 
1980-85  -6.4  1.7  -2.9 
~ 
Source:  Data are export volumes reported  in the IMF, Inrernarional Financial Staristics (Washington, DC), 
various issues. 
Nore; Growth rates calculated as geometric averages of  period shown. 
aNatural gas exports began in  1972. 
In  the  1960s,  investment  rates  were  very  high,  comparable  to  those 
of  the high-growth period  of  Brazil.  However, these rates were  sustained 
to a very significant extent by the contribution of foreign savings. Between 
1975 and  1978,  there  was  another  upsurge  in  the  investment rate,  sus- 
tained  similarly  by  foreign  savings,  leading  to  increased  indebtedness. 
The  investment  rate  fell  in  1981  in  line  with  the  increasing  diffi- 
culties in  obtaining foreign financing. From  1982 onward,  the investment 
rate  fell  precipitously  as  disbursements  of  foreign  credits  almost 
disappeared. 
As  shown in  table  1.8, the  contribution  of  domestic  savings  to  gross 
capital formation has  been  substantial and  should not  be  underestimated. 
I  I  I  I  I  1  b 
65  68  71  74  77  80  83  86 
REAL TIN  PRICE (0  1 
Fig. 1.2  Relative price of tin in world markets (1980 =  1.0) 168  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 1.7  Investment Rates (percentage of GDP), 1952-85 





































































Sources:  Ministry of  Planning, Revisru de Plunificucion y Desurrollo (La Paz: 1970); Central Bank of Bolivia, 
Boletin Esrudistico (La Paz), various issues; and unpublished World Bank data. 
Note:  Investment rates are computed as real investment divided by real  GDP. 
A high share of foreign savings in total investment was concentrated in a few 
subperiods: the 1960s, with foreign aid provided by the Alliance for Progress 
and with important foreign direct investment in the petroleum sector; and the 
late  1970s,  with  credits  from  commercial  banks  and  suppliers.  Gross 
national  savings (i.e., domestic savings less net factor income plus current 
transfers) as a percentage of  GNP experienced  large fluctuations over the 
years  1958-85.  During  most  of  the  1970s, the  saving  rate  was  over  15 
percent,  and  in  1974, it rose  to more  than  20 percent.  From  1978 on, 
however, the rate began to fall, eventually to very low levels in the years of 
the economic crisis. A picture emerges in which two features stand out: first, 
the  Bolivian  economy can generate respectable  national  saving rates  and, 
second,  these  high  rates  are  generally  the  product  of  high  growth  in  the 
economy  supported by  a  favorable terms of  trade  or by  access to foreign 
loans.  The  public  enterprises  played  an  important  role  in  generating 
domestic savings during these high-growth years. 
The domestic financial system, constituted  mainly by commercial banks, 
has played an important role in the formation of private savings. The data in 
table  1.9 indicate  that  financial  deepening  reached  its  maximum  in  the 
mid-1960s. It is interesting to note that the real value of monetary balances 
(measured as M2) in 1965 was the highest in the entire 1952-85  period and 
that this peak was obtained without the dollar-indexed savings deposits that 
were the most common form of deposit after 1975. The evidence seems to 
indicate that the most important factor that induced savings in the banking 
system in the 1960s was the low and stable inflation rates of those years. 169  BolividChapter  I 
lsble 1.8  Sources of Financing for Gross Capital Formation (as a proportion of  total), 
1952-85 
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37.0 
Sources: For  1952-79,  Central Bank of  Bolivia, Cuentas NacioMles no. 4;  for 1980-82,  Departamento de 
Cuentas Nacionales; for 1983-85,  elaborated with data from the World Banks. 
1.1.4  Inflation 
The annual inflation rates during 1952-88  are shown in table 1.10. It will 
be observed in that table that Bolivia had a bout with high inflation in the 
wake of the Revolution of  1952, that lasted until the stabilization of  1957. At 
that  time,  Bolivian inflation  rates  were  the  highest  ever known  in  Latin 
America. Inflation ended with an IMF-sponsored stabilization plan and with 
loans and subsidies from the U.S. government to support the budget. Details 
on that inflationary episode and how it was ended are given by Eder (1968). 
The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by low inflation, except after the 
devaluations of  late 1972 (and the protracted relative price adjustments that 
lasted until the first months of  1974) and of  late  1979. From  1980 onward 170  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 1.9  Monetary Variables as a Percentage of  GDP, 1961-85  (selected years) 
Year  Money Base  MI  M2 
1961  8.0  8.6  13.7 
1965  10.0  11.8  17.6 
1969  10.6  11.2  14.0 
1973  8.7  9.4  12.5 
1977  10.4  10.4  14.5 
1981  8.6  8.9  15.5 
1985  2.3  2.3  3.5 
Source:  Elaborated with data from Central Bank of  Bolivia, Memorias Anuales (La Paz), various issues. 
Note:  Monetary indicators are annual averages. 
lbble 1.10  AMUI  Inflatiun Rates, 1954-88 
Year  Inflation Rate  Year  Inflation Rate 
1954  124.8  1972  6.5 
1955  77.9  I973  31.4 
1956  181.2  1974  62.8 
1957  115.5  1975  8.0 
1958  3.0  1976  4.4 
1959  20.3  1977  8.1 
1960  11.5  1978  10.4 
1961  7.5  1979  19.7 
1962  5.8  1980  47.2 
1963  -  .7  1981  32.1 
1964  10.1  1982  123.5 
1965  2.9  1983  275.6 
I966  6.9  1984  1,282.4 
I967  11.1  1985  11,857.1 
1968  5.4  1986  276.3 
1969  2.2  1987  14.6 
1970  3.8  1988  16.0 
1971  3.6 
Sources:  For  1953-70,  Central Bank of  Bolivia, Memorim Anuales (1.a  Pa-r), varinus issues; for  1971-8I. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Resumen Esradistico (La Paz: 1982); for  1982-85,  Unidad de  Analisis de 
Politica Economica (UDAPE),  Anexo (La Paz); for 1986-88,  IMF, international Financial  Starisrics. 
Note: Rates are calculated as year-to-year changes of  annual average price levels. 
until the fall of  1985, inflation rates were very high, crossing the 100 percent 
barrier  in  1982.  Inflation  reached  hyperinflationary  levels  in  1984 (i.e., 
monthly  price  changes  in  excess  of  50  percent),  with  the  hyperinflation 
lasting from May  1984 to September 1985. The inflation ended dramatically 
with  the New  Economic Policy  of  the Paz Estenssoro government, which 
was launched on 29 August 1985. 
The Bolivian inflations of  1953-57  and 1982-85  had their roots in weak 
fiscal budgets. Importantly, Bolivia (unlike Brazil, for example) did not have 
the institutional mechanisms that produced inertial inflation. Wage indexation 
was implemented only in 1983, when high inflation was well on its way, and 171  BolividChapter  1 
lasted  until  August  1985. The  labor unions  have  had  little experience  in 
collective bargaining, and there have been very few formal labor contracts with 
escalator clauses or even with well-defined periods of validity. The practice in the 
labor unions has frequently been to ask for wage increases whenever there has 
been a significant erosion in real wages and to go to the Ministry of Labor for 
arbitration if the unions do not reach a settlement with the employers. During the 
last months of the hyperinflation, wages in many private sector firms, especially 
for qualified labor and in the service sector, were linked to the dollar in informal 
arrangements that were not legally binding. 
In the high-inflation episode of  1953-57,  the fiscal troubles were the result 
of  deliberate policies to  enhance production diversification projects in  the 
eastern region of Santa Cruz with deficit financing, that is, by printing money. 
Inflation was used to generate forced savings to finance capital expenditures 
in a growing public sector. In the more recent experience of the early eighties, 
the replacement of foreign financing by internal financing to cover prolonged 
fiscal deficits was the most important explanatory factor of high inflation. 
1.1.5  The Expansion of  the Coca Economy 
An important question that arises when studying the Bolivian economy of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s concerns the role played by coca production 
and exports of processed coca leaves in the form of cocaine paste or refined 
cocaine. After 1978, illegal cocaine exports became a very important source 
of  foreign exchange.  A booming underground economy developed around 
the coca trade,  with  far-reaching consequences for the legal sectors of  the 
Bolivian economy and for the international relations of Bolivia. 
Until  around  1975,  coca  leaves  were  marketed  essentially  for  legal 
domestic uses.5 The sharp increase in demand for cocaine (and other drugs) 
in  the  United  States that  started in the  1970s and  emerged later in other 
industrial countries strongly increased the demand for coca leaves. Production 
responded rapidly to  the demand  shift.  Coca paste  was  transported  from 
Bolivia to Colombia, refined there,  and marketed in the United States by 
Colombians. By  1980 some Bolivians started to refine the paste and market 
it without intermediaries in the U.S. market.  Bolivia’s involvement in the 
cocaine business increased rapidly and took several forms: production of coca 
leaves, coca paste, and refined cocaine. 
It  is  very  hard  to  come  up  with  precise  figures  concerning  Bolivia’s 
production and exports  of  coca-based products given the  illegality of  the 
activity, but preliminary estimates of the FOB value of cocaine chlorohydrate 
have been computed by Dona Medina (1986) using data on acreage prepared 
by  the  Earth  Satellite Corporation and  information on  the  technology of 
deriving cocaine from coca leaves. The figures, in  1980 dollars, are 412.2 
million  for  1980,  563.9  for  1981,  and  758.5  for  1982.  In  1980  this 
represented 40 percent of recorded exports of  goods and services; in  1981, 
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If export values are difficult to estimate, gross value added in the cocaine 
industry (and related activities) are even harder to come by. Under the rather 
arbitrary  assumption  that  material  inputs  other  than  coca  leaves  are  20 
percent  of  gross output in  cocaine chlorohydrates,  the  gross value added 
estimates would represent 5.7 percent of GDP in  1980; 7.5 percent of GDP 
in  1981; and  10.8 percent  in  1982.  If  one  considers  cocaine  and  coca 
production as vertically integrated industries, these percentages increase to 
7.3,  8.8, and  12.7,  respectively. Undoubtedly, these figures are very high, 
but significantly less than the wild estimates sometimes given in the press. 
1.2  Summary of the Monograph 
With this basic introduction to the Bolivian economy, we  now  turn to a 
summary of the remainder of  the monograph. The outline of  the work is as 
follows.  Chapter  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  political  economy  of 
macroeconomic policymaking in  Bolivia since the  1952 Revolution. Great 
stress is put on the weakness of fiscal institutions in the face of  heavy social 
and  sectoral demands.  The  chronic  fiscal  weakness led  to  a  remarkably 
overextended public sector, one that reached effective bankruptcy by  1985. 
During the period of hyperinflation, 1984-85,  the government paid its way 
almost entirely through money printing. 
Chapter 3 highlights some of  the main directions of  development policy 
during 1952- 85, especially involving public investment spending and trade 
policy. We  show that most of  the period is characterized by  a development 
strategy of “state capitalism,”  in which the public sector is called upon to be 
the leading engine of growth through public sector investment spending and 
overall guidance of the private sector. The paradoxical result,  however,  is 
that as the government tried to control too much, it ended up controlling very 
little indeed. The model of state capitalism was particularly undermined by 
the chronic instability in policymaking that resulted from the rapid turnover 
of  governments. 
In  chapter 4  we  consider important characteristics of  Bolivia’s interna- 
tional trade, focusing bo&h  on structural features (e.g., the heavy dependence 
on a small number of primary commodities), as well as policy choices. Our 
analysis of  trade policies since 1952 makes clear that Bolivian governments 
continued to  focus on  primary commodity exports  as the key  to Bolivian 
growth, despite the secular decline in tin and the mixed fortunes regarding 
petroleum exports.6 Bolivian governments typically  spent  more  time  and 
energy on attempting to improve the terms of  trade for tin (mainly through 
the  International  Tin  Agreement,  which  collapsed  in  1985)  than  on  a 
diversification of  the export base into manufacturing. 
Import policies have generally been ill-focused, leading to an enormous 
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strategy in the distribution of  incentives and with little attention to the indirect 
effects of import policies on the profitability of exports. Similarly, exchange rate 
policies were often pursued for fiscal purposes (e.g., overvalued exchange rates 
allowed the central government to appropriate some of  the rents from export- 
oriented state enterprises that were otherwise hard to tax),  rather than  for the 
purpose of stimulating nontraditional exports. 
Chapter 5 describes the process of foreign debt accumulation, which was 
the counterpart of the large budget deficits of  the public sector in the 1970s 
and  early  1980s.  Bolivia’s  external  debt,  particularly  from  the  private 
financial markets, rose dramatically in the 1970s, mostly during the Banzer 
era.  Bolivia’s  rapid  accumulation of  external debt  in  the  1970s reflected 
three forces at work. First, part of the foreign borrowing financed a plausible 
attempt to generate a more diversified export base through various invest- 
ment projects. Some of  these projects were successful, but more often the 
investments proved to be expensive failures. Second, the foreign borrowing 
also reflected an attempt to finesse internal distributional conflicts by  using 
borrowed money to pay for social demands for spending. Third, some of the 
foreign borrowing had the purpose and effect of  enriching a narrow set of 
private interests through the public sector’s access to foreign loans. Similarly, 
an overvalued exchange rate, maintained through foreign borrowing, became 
a channel for capital flight for wealthier individuals. 
By  the late 1970s, the precariousness of  Bolivia’s financial situation was 
clear. Banks pulled back from new  lending, and in  1980 Bolivia began to 
miss payments due to the banks.  Note that this occurred almost two years 
ahead of  the global  debt  crisis,  usually  dated to  Mexico’s suspension of 
principal payments in August 1982. Bolivia signed a rescheduling agreement 
with  the  banks  in  April  1981,  which  fell  apart  when  Bolivia  missed 
payments due in September 1982. Payments were restarted in 1983, but then 
suspended again  in  mid-1984.  Since  then,  Bolivia  has  made  no  interest 
payments to the commercial banks. 
Chapter 6 lays out the dynamics of  the hyperinflation  during  1982-85, 
focusing on the complex causal links among the budget deficit, the money 
supply, the exchange rate, and the price level. President Hernhn Siles Suazo 
therefore inherited an  extraordinarily difficult financial position in  October 
1982.  In  the  event,  the  Siles  government  was  too  weak  and  often  too 
confused in its  policies to restore fiscal order. Siles tried several times to 
implement a comprehensive stabilization program (during November  1982, 
November 1983, April  1984, August 1984, November  1984, and February 
1985),  but  in  each  of  these  cases,  some  combination  of  Siles’  political 
opponents  in  Congress  and  his  ostensible  “allies”  in  organized  labor 
torpedoed the adjustment efforts. As the inflation accelerated, tax collections 
fell sharply in real terms, thereby exacerbating the fiscal crisis. The inflation 
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1983 to  several  thousand  percent  in  1984 and  1985.  The  hyperinflation 
began in  May  1984 and ended in September  1985, upon the accession to 
power of the Paz Estenssoro government. 
In chapter 7 we detail the process of  stabilization since 1985 and discuss 
some of the general lessons about ending high inflation that might be applied 
to other economies in the region. The successful stabilization program was 
carried out by the newly elected centrist government of  Paz Estenssoro. The 
economic program, which was unveiled just three weeks after the govern- 
ment  came  to  office,  was  remarkably  wide  ranging  and  indeed  radical, 
encompassing not  only plans for macroeconomic stabilization but also for 
trade  liberalization,  administrative and  tax  reform,  and  deregulation and 
privatization in the domestic market. The so-called New  Economic Policy 
constituted nothing  less than  a  program  to  dismantle the  system of  state 
capitalism that had prevailed over the previous thirty years. 
Chapter 8 describes the novel arrangements that Bolivia has negotiated in 
order  to  escape  the  severe  overhang  of  external  debt.  Bolivia  took  one 
“heterodox”  step  in  its  stabilization  program:  it  maintained  a  total 
suspension  of  interest payments on  its  commercial bank  debt,  pending  a 
longer-term settlement on the debt. For this reason,  the  Bolivian program 
might be  characterized as “internal  orthodoxy, external heterodoxy.”  The 
debt suspension was an integral piece of the political and economic strategy 
of  the government. 
The  Bolivian  debt  strategy  paid  off.  After  years  of  negotiations, 
Bolivia’s  creditor  banks  ultimately  accepted  the  argument  that  the  debt 
should be reduced. Bolivia won the right to buy back part of  its debt at the 
secondary market price,  under the condition that  it use money donated by 
donor  governments  to  pay  for  the  buyback.  In  May  1988,  Bolivia 
repurchased  $308  million  in  principal  (approximately 47  percent  of  the 
outstanding debt) from the commercial bank creditors,  at a price of  about 
11 cents on the dollar. Bolivia continued to repurchase debt at  11 percent 
of  par and  by  mid-1989 had  repurchased in  total  about 70 percent of  the 
outstanding debt. 
In  the  concluding  chapter  9,  we  discuss  briefly  the  challenges  facing 
Bolivia in the future, once stabilization has been accomplished. The key fact 
that we focus on is the weakness of Bolivia’s traditional export base and the 
consequent need  for the  development of  new  sources of  export  earnings. 
Bolivia will  have to diversify beyond  mineral  exports  to  new  agricultural 
exports and light manufacturing. The latter could be spurred importantly by 
an opening of the Brazilian market to Bolivian light manufacturing exports. 
We  stress that accomplishing this transition will require careful and sensitive 
attention to  regional  and  social  conflicts which  remain  powerful  in  the 
country.  The  government  will  probably  have  to  contemplate  specific 
measures to address these conflicts so that the structural transformation can 
proceed with internal political stability. 